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I graduated from the Naval Command Course (NCC) at the U.S. Naval War Col-
lege in Newport, Rhode Island, in 1965. On my return to India, I reported at Na-
val Headquarters New Delhi for an appointment at sea. As a matter of protocol
and having undergone training abroad, I was required to call on the Chief of the
Naval Staff (our CNO) to apprise him of my assessment of the NCC course. I
briefly narrated the curriculum, concluding that it was a wholesome course pro-
moting understanding amongst the international naval community. After care-
fully listening, the Chief shot a straight question back at me: “Do you believe this
training in the USA is of any value to the Indian Navy or a prop to your personal
career?” I was taken aback a bit, but collecting my wits, I replied that such an ex-
posure as in the NCC should help one to contribute to the interests of the Navy
in the long run, and that my career was only a side issue. He gave an enigmatic
smile. To date I have not been able to figure out whether the Chief thought that I
believed in what I said.
It was exactly six years after the NCC experience, in 1971, that I had the privi-
lege of commanding the only aircraft carrier of the Indian Navy, INS Vikrant.
The tension between India and Pakistan was building up. The USA/Soviet
Union cold war was at its height, with the famous U.S. tilt against India. A good
deal is on record as to how the nuclear carrier task force led by USS Enterprise
(the “Big E”) was sailed from the Far East to create a presence in the Bay of Ben-
gal to influence the outcome of the Indo-Pakistani conflict.
INS Vikrant Task Force, comprising the carrier and three antiaircraft/anti-
submarine frigates, was deployed in the Bay of Bengal with a directive to estab-
lish a Zone of Command to ensure that there was no outside interference from
the sea with the advancing Indian Army in the erstwhile East Pakistan (now Ban-
gladesh). In the execution of its aim the Indian Task Force had in a short time
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captured about forty foreign and Pakistani ships attempting to break the
blockade to reach East Pakistan ports, carrying reinforcements and supplies
for the beleaguered Pakistani Army. By 12th December, 1971, the fighting on
land had entered the final phase in favour of the Indian Army. INS Vikrant
was on patrol north of Andaman Islands blocking the approaches to
Chittagong when, on 15th December, late in the evening, the BBC announced
the entry of the “Big E” task force in the Bay of Bengal. The broadcast added
that the U.S. task force was to make for Chittagong to evacuate the stranded
American citizens.
This was a bolt from the blue. I conjured up a situation of a direct confronta-
tion. I waited for instructions from the Naval Headquarters but none arrived. It
was later at night that I decided to proceed south anyway, to intercept the “Big E”
before she could enter the war zone. It was near midnight when the Midshipman
on Watch approached me on the bridge and sought permission to ask a ques-
tion. I nodded, and he said, “Sir, what would you do when you sight the ‘Big E’?”
This question was no doubt uppermost on my mind, but without any hesitation
I replied, “You do not have to worry, young man. America is a friendly country,
so I would wish the captain of the ‘Big E’ a good morning and ask him what I
could do for him.” The midshipman was not convinced and added, “What if the
‘Big E’ opened fire against us?” I replied, “I have been educated in the Naval War
College, and I understand the American psychology well. If the ‘Big E’ attacks us,
Abraham Lincoln would be turning in his grave.”
Throughout that night Vikrant continued her sortie south, and our air recce
covered an area to a depth of five hundred miles. There was no sign of the U.S.
task force, so in the absence of any instruction from the Naval Headquarters I
turned back north to rejoin my patrol area. As the day dawned, BBC broadcast
amplified its earlier report: that having entered the Bay of Bengal from the
Malacca Straits, the U.S. task force had proceeded west instead of going north to
Chittagong. On reflection I felt that my reactions in the warlike situation proved
the value of my tenure at the NCC.
As a postscript to this anecdote, soon after the victory of the Indian Armed
Forces, one of the foreign celebrities that visited India was the renowned naval
leader Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, chief of the Soviet Navy. During his visit to Bom-
bay he came onboard Vikrant. I had known the admiral well earlier during my ten-
ure in Moscow as the Indian naval attaché. The admiral congratulated me and
asked, “Were you worried about a battle against the American carrier?” He an-
swered himself: “Well, you had no reason to be worried, as I had a Soviet nuclear
submarine trailing the American task force all the way into the Indian Ocean.”
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I thought to myself, it is not easy to convert a cold war into a hot war. Cold war
is brinkmanship and only posturing. When the chips are down, you do not play
cat and mouse games but come prepared to hit hard to vanquish your adversary.
SWARAJ PARKASH
Vice Admiral, Indian Navy (Ret.)
NCC class of 1965
SHOOTING UP THE WORLD
Sir:
In “The Military Response to Terrorism” [NWCR, Summer 2000, pp. 13–39],
Captain Mark Kosnik makes the argument that military force is useful and
modifies the behavior of terrorist groups. The attack on the USS Cole proves him
wrong. We have enemies. We cannot shoot up the world—Panama, Grenada,
Somalia, Kosovo (where we unlawfully interfered in a civil war and made it
worse), Afghanistan, Libya (where we demolished an apparently innocent pill
factory, and where we targeted the leader and killed his daughter)—and not
have enemies. By what right (and for what purpose) do we establish a no-fly
zone over a sovereign nation?
The misuse of military force is costly—in treasure, in readiness, in otherwise
unnecessary defensive measures, and in the establishment of enemies.
H. F. ROMMEL
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
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